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Abstract 
Empirical research on the role of economic institutions for subjective well-being is still 
widely lacking, while recent economic-experimental outcomes suggest that experienced 
utility may depend on the intensity of market competition. This paper is the first to 
empirically analyze the implication of market competition for subjective well-being using 
real-life survey data on 80,000 individuals in more than 60 countries from the World 
Values Survey 1997-2001. In support of our hypothesis, we find that market competition 
aggravates the impact of individual’s bargaining position in economic transactions on her 
subjective well-being – compared to the least powerful in society. Put differently, we find 
that market competition enlarges the happiness differences caused by cleavages in socio-
economic position. Our results also suggest that competition-induced welfare changes are 
not gender-specific, while a stronger rule of law appears to prevent the generation of such 
additional benefits or losses. Particularly the latter results call for further economic-
experimental corroboration in the laboratory, but also bear important policy implications.  
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Introduction 
 
“It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our 
dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves not to their 
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our necessities but of their 
advantages. Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the benevolence of 
their fellow-citizens.“  
(Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, 1776) 
 
Adam Smith (1776) once used the metaphor of the ‘invisible hand’ to illustrate the 
importance of well-functioning free markets for mutually beneficial economic exchange 
and, finally, individual well-being. More specifically, A. Smith viewed intentionally, 
rational self-interested behavior in a competitive market setting as the driving force for 
unintentional welfare gains. With these thoughts having been developed further by Leon 
Walras (1874), also modern economic textbooks praise market competition for its 
welfare-improving impacts that are usually associated with, on the sellers’ side, the 
pressure to innovate and to lower production costs, and, on the buyers’ side, maximal 
consumer surplus through range of choice, high quality of goods and ‘just’ prices that 
reflect (only) the marginal costs of production. In contrast, the absence of competition on 
either side of the market is demonstrated to allow for monopoly or monopsony mark-ups 
that redistribute rents from the less influential to the more powerful market participants, 
and, in consequence, causes a shift in welfare from one market side to the other.
2   
Although happiness research has its origins in psychology, it is now also blossoming in 
the fields of economics; however, the empirical analysis of economic, political or social 
institutions on individual well-being is still in its infancy. While the influence of political 
institutions such as democracy or federalism have been quite well documented (e.g. Frey 
                                                 
2  As known, a part of societal welfare (deadweight loss) is lost in this process.  
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and Stutzer 2000, Bjørnskov et al 2008a, Dorn et al. 2007, 2008,), there is still a 
substantial research void when it comes to assessing the effects of market institutions, 
defined as formal and informal institutions that govern economic transactions between 
selling and buying individuals or firms over markets, such as market competition. In 
addition, most of these studies do not take into account that institutions might exert 
differential impacts on well-being depending on individuals’ socio-economic position 
and socio-demographic characteristics such as gender or income.
3  
To fill this gap, this paper aims to test implications of market competition for individual 
well-being, taking into account that its effects may interplay with one’s bargaining 
position in economic transactions, using individual-level ‘field’ data on subjective well-
being of about 80,000 persons in more than 60 countries obtained from the World Values 
Survey (1997 – 2001). According to neoclassical economic theory, the degree of market 
competition rises with the number of agents on either side of the market, and maximum 
market competition is achieved when market power on either side is absent. Moreover, 
this paper also tests to what extent the effects of market competition differ (a) between 
genders and (b) by a country’s quality of the legal and judicial systems which constitute 
an important component of the institutional framework for market transactions. To our 
best knowledge, we do not know of any other empirical contribution in economics that 
analyzes the impact of market competition on well-being. 
In principle, the hypotheses on the impact of market competition on well-being and its 
interplay with individual bargaining power, gender, and the rule of law are drawn from 
previous research in experimental economics. As many economic experiments still focus 
on players’ performance and thus on pay-off distribution as outcome, the novelty of this 
paper lies equally in developing analogous hypotheses for subjective well-being, besides 
testing them against cross-country micro-level field data.  
In support of our hypothesis, our results show that market competition (on the other side) 
appears to benefit the ‘winners’ by reinforcing the well-being raising impact of having a 
                                                 
3  A comprehensive robustness test of the impact of a wide range of political, cultural, economic and human 
development factors for subjective well-being can be found in Bjørnskov et al 2008.   
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better bargaining position in transactions – compared to the least powerful economic 
agent. In other words, compared to a median bargaining position, persons with lesser 
market power experience additional welfare losses as market competition intensifies, 
while persons above the median appear significantly better off. Thus, market competition 
appears to enlarge happiness differences caused by socio-economic cleavages. However, 
estimations for gender subsamples suggest that there are no additional gender-specific 
welfare gains as market competition increases, while a stronger rule of law appears to 
prevent the generation of such additional benefits or losses. In the remaining part of the 
paper, section 2 presents experimental economics evidence and derives the hypotheses, 
while section 3 describes the data and introduces the model. The empirical results are 
presented in section 4, while section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2 Experimental economics evidence and derivation of hypotheses 
Although experimental economics literature has almost exploded during the last years, 
there appear to be only very few experiments that deal with the question how the 
introduction of market competition, defined as absence of any market power in the 
tradition of neoclassical economics theory, affects players’ experienced utilities.
4 To our 
knowledge, the sole relevant contribution is the study by Brandts, Riedl and van Winden 
(2006), that explicitly tests the impact of market competition on players’ happiness in a 
repeated
5 social dilemma game.
6 They observe the effects of market competition for 
“subjects’ subjective (experienced) well-being” (Brandts et al., 2006, p.20) by surveying 
the participants’ emotions at the end of the experiment and comparing the participants’ 
                                                 
4  In this paper, we use the notions ‘happiness’, ‘life satisfaction’, ‘(subjective) well-being’ and 
‘(experienced) utility’ interchangeably.  
5  Games are repeated over 30 rounds with identical interacting players (fixed players with fixed roles). 
6  We are not aware of any other economic experiment that tried to measure the impact of (market) 
competition on players’ well-being. The financial (pay-off-related) effects of competition have been tested 
with ultimatum games and Bertrand bidding games in e.g. Fischbacher et al. (2003), Dufwenberg and 
Gneezy (2000), Fauraker and Siegel (1963). For evidence of the rank dependence of the effects of 
competition among mammals, see Van Loo et al., (2001).   
  5 
answers across the two different treatments.
7 The first treatment reflects the presence of 
market competition by setting up a ‘triad’ game structure in which one player chooses in 
each round among two potential trade partners prior to any transaction.
8 In the alternative 
setting, market competition is absent as only two fixed trade partners are present (dyad 
structure).  
Brandts et al. (2006) find that with competition on the other side of the market, monopoly 
player A, having the ‘power to choose’ among two potential trade partners, is the 
happiest player among all games and players, being significantly happier than (1) any of 
her trade partners B and C or (2) any of the two players in a game with no competition 
(dyad game), who both experience equal levels of happiness. On the long side of the 
market in the triad game, the less often chosen player (let’s call him C) is shown to be 
significantly unhappier than the more frequently chosen trade partner (player B), 
although both have identical market power. Thus, as relation (1) illustrates, there is a 
clear-cut hierarchy of experienced well-being across players and treatments.
9 
 
A (triad) > A/B (dyad) = B (triad) > C (triad)                                (1) 
 
In our view, players’ experienced utilities can possibly be broken down into the following 
components: (1) the realized financial gain (pay-off) as part of outcome utility, (2) 
frequency of trade contacts as means of social interaction (procedural utility), (3) the 
enjoyment of bargaining or market power (procedural utility), which we relate to the 
emotional benefit experienced when excluding potential trade partners. Arguably, the 
well-being effects of ‘the power to choose’ may well depend on the degree of 
competition on one’s own side, but equally on that on the other side of the market. Most 
                                                 
7  Subjective well-being was assessed by asking about participants’ general mood using pictures with 
abstract facial expressions mirroring a 9-point scale developed by psychologists of which one had to be 
chosen by the subject. Using these so-called ‘Self-Assessment Manikins’ mitigates the impact of potential 
framing.  
8  The excluded player received a small remuneration that was lower by construction than the symmetric 
payoffs in the Nash equilibrium or the cooperative equilibrium, but higher than in a situation of (cooperate, 
defect) for the cooperating player.   
9  See also the summary in ‘Result 4’ in Brandts et al. (2006, p.21).  
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probably, this procedural utility effect is independent of the achieved financial gain 
(outcome utility). Note also that competition seems to trigger higher insecurity of 
earnings on either side of the market (cf. Brandts et al., 2006, p.16). In order to determine 
the impact of market competition on players’ well-being, these partly overlapping effects 
have to be disentangled.  
As regards the financial gains and the frequency of trade, these are (separately) conducive 
to well-being, ceteris paribus, as various regression analyses by Brandts et al. (2006) 
suggest. In particular, the authors find that negative emotions are triggered by 
experiencing a lower trade frequency, for a given level of earnings. Arguably, that higher 
pay-offs or income are conducive to happiness is a finding that is well known (e.g. 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).
10   
The effects of market competition for well-being are most easily assessed by analyzing 
its impact on player A’s happiness. For monopoly player A, a well-being gain between 
the non-competition and the competition settings is observable. At first sight, an increase 
in either pay-off or trade frequency might serve as explanation. However, we can rule out 
these explanations as, on average, player A’s earnings do not significantly differ between 
the dyad and the triad games and trade frequencies are fairly identical across the two 
settings.
11 Moreover, given that competition is introduced on the opposing side of the 
market, a change in her own market power cannot be related to the increase in her well-
being. In other words, with her income, trade frequency, and market power staying 
unchanged, Brandts et al. (2006) still find that intensifying competition on the other side 
of the market is conducive to monopoly player A’s well-being, obviously dominating the 
potentially utility lowering effect of increasing income insecurity. In this paper, we 
conjecture that such non-financial benefits of market competition on the other side can be 
explained by positive emotions player A experiences when exerting her ‘power to 
choose’. Most possibly, this ‘joy of choosing’ rises with the number of potential trade 
partners (and thus with competition), as the findings by Brandts et al. (2006) suggest.   
                                                 
10  For the impact of national income, that might equally represent the number of transactions aggregated to 
the country level, on individual well-being, see e.g. Bjørnskov et al. (2008). 
11  Similarly, cooperation levels were fairly identical across the dyad and the triad games.   
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Figure 1 illustrates the well-being comparisons for player A under the two different 
environmental settings - the dyad and the triad games – suggesting not only that exerting 
monopoly power per se is conducive to happiness (cf. A(dyad) > C(triad) in relation (1)), 
but even more that market competition exerts an aggravating impact on this positive 
market power effect (cf. A(triad) > A (dyad) in relation (1)) (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Well-being of monopoly player A  
  Player A 




Not observed  +  




Not observed  + +  
(A(triad) > A(dyad)) 
Notes: ‘+’ indicates “some welfare gains”, ‘+ +’ “substantial welfare gains”.  
 
While a well-being increasing impact of competition on the other market side on 
monopolist player A can easily be concluded from the experiment, due to the complex 
tangle of influences, the welfare effects of market competition on the (long) market side 
in which it is introduced (players B and C) cannot be unambiguously identified. In 
general, when moving from the dyad to the triad game structure, the introduction of 
competition on the long side of the market leads not only to a decrease in the incumbent’s 
market power, but also, due to a locked-in effect, to substantial differences in trade  
  8 
frequencies and, thus, financial gains between these two players.
12 Overlapping effects 
are also observable when comparing the utility level of player B with that of player C 
within the triad game: as both players enjoy identical market power, the experienced 
utility gap may be caused simultaneously by differences in both trade frequency and 
earnings. In all these comparisons on the long side of the market, the well-being effects 
of competition per se remain disguised. On the other hand, these observations on the long 
side do not contradict an analogous application of an assumed interaction effect of market 




In economic transactions, market competition re-enforces the bargaining power effect for 
participants’ subjective well-being.  
 
Impact by gender 
Experimental research on gender-specific well-being effects of market competition is 
missing. However, we might develop preliminary hypothesis based on related economic 
laboratory and field experiments that investigate the impact of competition among 
participants (tournaments) and competitive environments on individual performance. 
This experimental research suggests men and women not only to exhibit differences in 
their risk-taking behavior and their attitude towards competition, but also to differ in their 
willingness to adapt to such an environment (e.g. Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004). For 
example, Gneezy et al. (2003) use experiments with mace-solving exercises to show that, 
when players are being rewarded based on their performance relative to that of their 
competitors (‘the winner takes all’), male participants, on average, increase their number 
of solved maces and, thus, perform significantly better than female players. In contrast, 
                                                 
12  Indeed, Brandts et al. (2006) report that having been the trade partner in round t-1 increases the 
likelihood of becoming a trade partner in the following rounds. In explanation, repeated interaction with the 
identical trading partner across rounds is favorable for monopoly player A as it facilitates reaching the 
cooperative equilibrium. That longer trade relations tend to generate larger rents was also observed by 
Brown et al. (2004) in an incomplete contract setting.  
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male and female performances are similar in the non-competitive setting, namely when 
players are remunerated individually and irrespective of the others’ performance. In 
another experiment reported in Gneezy and Rustichini (2004) nine and ten years old boys 
and girls, who at that age have identical physical strength, were asked to race first by 
themselves and then in competitive pairs of two with a similar first round performance. 
While no gender gap in running speed was observable in the first round, in the second 
race boys showed improvements in their speed, while girls ran even slowlier than 
before.
13 Again, the main finding of this experiment is that “competition improves 
performance relative to a non-competitive environment for boys, but not for girls” (ibid., 
p.379).
14  
That women are less competition-liking per se, even though no gender difference in 
abilities is eminent, is also the conclusion drawn by Niederle and Vesterlund (2007). 
They find that women, in general, including high-performing women, tend to avoid 
competitive situations compared to alike men, even if the competitive scheme is the pay-
off maximizing earning scheme in the games played. Explanations offered are not only 
gender-specific heterogeneity of preferences over remuneration schemes, but also gender 
differences in receiving feedback as well as relative overconfidence of men regarding 
their own future performance. Indeed, the trust game experiments by Fershtman and 
Gneezy (2001) suggest that women have a preference for an equal distribution of pay-
offs. Theories of evolutionary biology and sociobiology suggest that these gender 
differences in attitudes and behavior might well be grounded in the differential costs of 
reproduction and thus be genetically determined (e.g. Knight, 2002). 
Overall, these economic experiments suggest for societal reality that a competitive 
environment may exert differential impacts on performance by gender, and that men are 
more likely to successfully adapt to such an environment. Indeed, Niederle and 
Vesterlund (2007) report evidence that the female population gains economically 
                                                 
13  More specifically, boys’ improvements were largest in equal-gender pairs, while girls’ performances 
were worst in homogenous pairs. In mixed-gender pairs, boys substantially improved, what was not 
observed for girls.  
14  These gender-specific differences in behavior occur irrespective of the type of reward for the winner – 
with both intrinsic and extrinsic (namely financial) motivation.  
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relatively less compared to the male from competition at college or competition for top 
jobs. The latter observation already mixes effects of tournament-type competition with 
that of market competition (that might well entail a tournament component on the long 
side), allowing us to attempt to predict gender-specific welfare effects of market 
competition. Thus, we may tentatively draw the general conclusion that in real life there 
are gender-specific advantages or disadvantages in profiting from market competition, 
such that men should be relatively more able to turn market power into successful rent 
extraction compared to women and, thus, possibly, experience higher utility levels. As 
competition rises, this gender gap in well-being should increase. The following figure 
(Figure 2) and hypothesis 2 summarize our predictions: 
 
Figure 2: Gender-specific welfare gains  
  Strong bargaining position  Weak bargaining position 
  Comp. low  Comp. high  Comp. low  Comp. high 
Men  +  + +  _  _ 
Women  +  +  _  _ _ 
         
Notes: ‘+’ indicates “some gains”, ‘+ +’ “substantial gains”, and ‘-‘, ‘- -‘ analogously for 
losses.  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
In economic transactions, market competition exerts a gender-specific impact on the 
ability to turn market power into welfare gains, in favor of men.  
  
  11 
Completeness of contracts 
The social dilemma experiments conducted by Brandts et al. (2006) were all in a setting 
with incomplete contracts, implying that the action of the responding side could not be 
enforced. We will now consider the welfare effects of market competition when contracts 
are complete, on both sides of the market likewise. Given that suitable economic-
experimental evidence is widely lacking, we will resort to speculating on the welfare 
implications of market competition. A complete contract is defined as a situation in 
which each player’s responsibilities for all foreseeable situations are fixed ex ante, and an 
enforceable and enforced sanction for defecting is set.  
Since we are not aware of social dilemma experiments with complete contracts, we may 
draw analogous conclusions from market experiment outcomes. In a market experiment 
buyers offer prices to sellers for a specific indivisible consumption good; these offers can 
be either rejected or accepted. If a seller accepts, the good is produced with a quality at 
the seller’s discretion, then the exchange takes place and the gains from trade manifest. 
Otherwise, in case of no acceptance, no trade takes place and no party wins anything. In 
these market games, the complete contract setting is reflected in an exogenously 
(contractually) fixed quality of the good, and only the price can be negotiated on.  
These market experiments have shown that completeness of contracts allows the 
monopolist trader to extract the maximum rent, being able to fully exploit her bargaining 
position. This phenomenon occurs independently of which side of the market is 
monopolized as long as the number of competitors on the other side is sufficiently large 
(Cason and Williams 1990, Kachelmaier and Shehata 1992).
15 Obviously, the 
completeness of contracts eradicates the inequality diminishing effect of mutual 
reciprocity, altering the effects of the bargaining power for players’ pay-off distribution. 
In contrast, under an incomplete contract setting, there is a strong monetary incentive for 
buyers to signal trust to sellers and induce reciprocal behavior by paying higher prices, 
                                                 
15  In the presence of market competition and complete contracts, theoretical models predict and 
experiments show that the reservation Nash-price is paid by the buyer while the seller chooses the Nash-
minimum quality (see Fehr et al., 1998, for more literature).   
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for the cooperative equilibrium outcome with a higher good’s quality to realize.
16 In other 
words, the completeness of contracts leaves no room for fairness motives or reciprocation 
to influence the experimental game outcome (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  
In sum, these market experiments suggest for the social dilemma games as played by 
Brandts et al. (2006) that, when allowing for ‘contracting away’ players’ discretion (e.g. 
over effort levels in labor markets or quality choice as producer), completeness of 
contracts may affect the financial and potentially the non-financial outcomes of the 
games. In consequence, conclusions for the expected interaction of market competition 
with market power with respect to individual well-being might be drawn.  
First, in the social dilemma game, completeness of contracts may trigger an increase in 
monopoly player A’s financial gains from trade due to additional rent-extraction. The 
size of these additional gains should be unaffected by small changes in the number of 
competitors on the other side of the market. The reason is that her pay-offs are 
independent from whom she selects as potential trade partner and how many of them are 
available, as she can always enforce a contract that extracts the maximum rent.
17 In other 
words, we expect no interplay between the degree of market competition and market 
power with respect to player A’s pay-offs. Second, an analogous argument applies to 
trade frequency, which may equally stay unaffected by moderate variations in the 
intensity of market competition, due to perfect enforceability of contracts and players’ 
profit-maximizing behavior. Furthermore and third, the reduction in income insecurity 
under complete contracts will be independent of the degree of competition as it is 
triggered by the completeness of contracts itself. In sum, we have reasons to expect no 
interplay between market competition and bargaining power with respect to income, trade 
frequency, or income insecurity, economic outcomes that might serve as mediating 
variables of the effects of competition for experienced utility.  
                                                 
16  Indeed, Fehr et al (1993) show that under incomplete contracts buyers offer a price substantially above 
their reservation price, while the quality of the delivered good increases linearly in buyers’ prices. 
17  Please note that this argument assumes some minimum level of competition on the other side of the 
market. Predictions might be different with two monopoly/monopsony players interacting.   
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However, based on Brandts et al. (2006) under incomplete contracts we related the 
observed well-being increase for player A due to market competition to the ‘joy of 
rejecting other players’, as her pay-offs or trade frequency were not affected. The 
question is whether such positive emotions are still present when contracts are complete. 
Again, due to missing evidence from economic laboratory experiments, we can only 
make preliminary conjectures.  
In this paper, we postulate that under completeness of contracts the introduction of 
market competition on the other side does not evoke such positive emotions of choosing 
or rejecting potential trade partners. In consequence, we do not expect an interaction 
between market power and market competition with respect to well-being. We offer two 
plausible explanations for our conjecture. The first reason is that, economically, the well-
being effects of the ‘power to choose’ may be too small to merit its deliberate exertion 
under complete contracts. More specifically, the psychic costs of selecting one among 
several trade partners may exceed the emotional benefit from having rejected the other 
players. Consequently, a rational player will avoid these costs of decision-making by 
selecting trade partners at random, and, thus, not exerting her power intentionally. In 
contrast, under the incomplete contract setting player A’s well-being gains from 
deliberate choice constitute a byproduct of her rational and intentional pay-off 
maximization that builds on triggering opponent’s reciprocal behavior.  
However, even if psychic and time costs of non-random choice were sufficiently low, the 
question arises whether positive feelings of ‘rejecting others’ are induced at all. More 
specifically, we believe that allowing for complete contracts leads to an 
impersonalization of the negative emotions experienced by those not having been chosen, 
so that the monopoly player A cannot draw additional emotional benefits from her 
position as market competition intensifies. In other words, we conjecture that 
completeness of contracts disentangles the (otherwise interdependent) utility functions of 
players A from those of B and C. In detail, we believe that - from the viewpoint of 
players B and C - the completeness of contract provides player A with some ‘absolute 
power’, so that rejected players will hold the institutional setting rather than player A’s 
choice responsible for their rejection. In consequence, a rejection may not cause the  
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development of any ‘personalized’ negative feelings (against player A). Player A, in turn, 
anticipating only ‘impersonalized’ emotional reactions, thus, is not able to draw positive 
feelings from having rejected a trade partner. In sum, under complete contracts, ‘exerting 
the power to choose’ is not likely to affect monopoly player A’s well-being, which, 
consequently, is then independent of the degree of market competition (the number of 
players) on the other side.  
In sum, when contracts are complete, from the viewpoint of monopoly player A, we 
hypothesize the intensity of market competition not to aggravate the market power 
effects for her well-being, in contrast to the incomplete contract setting. Again, analogous 
conclusions may be drawn for the players on the other side of the market, as they may 
hold the institutional setting responsible for the outcome. Based on these thoughts, we 
formulate the following hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 3:  
Under complete contracts, there should be no interplay between market competition and 
bargaining power in economic transactions with respect to subjective well-being.  
 
 
3 Data and model 
Data 
For analyzing our research question we employ the 3
rd and 4
th waves of the World Values 
Survey (WVS) that contains socio-demographic information on about 80’000 individuals 
in more than 60 countries. As dependent variable we employ the WVS measure of life 
satisfaction that gives information on the interviewee’s response to the question: “All 
things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?”  This 
categorical measure of subjective well-being takes on values between 1 (very  
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dissatisfied) and 10 (very satisfied). The individual-level control variables are equally 
obtained from the WVS dataset. For descriptive statistics, see Table 1.  
Market competition in individual i's economy, in which trade, economic exchange and 
public goods creation take place, is approximated by the degree of her country’s exposure 
to the forces of economic globalization. The KOF index of economic globalization 
measures the integration of a national economy in the world market through international 
trade linkages and financial transfers (Dreher, 2006). This index proxies domestic market 
competition in two ways: First, it accounts for the pressure of global market competition 
through the credible threat of market entry by foreign competitors into domestic markets. 
Consequently, domestic suppliers are then forced to stay competitive and set their prices 
as if they had no market power. Pressure on domestic firms to produce efficiently and 
innovate might also be exerted by competition in foreign markets to which domestic 
firms intend to export to. Second, the KOF index of economic globalization also 
measures actual competition in domestic markets that is exerted through actually present 
numerous foreign competitors that sell their imported goods in these domestic markets.  
However, the degree of market competition and economic globalization might well be 
correlated with economic development or income inequality (or, alternatively, the size of 
the welfare state), confounding the interpretation of our results.
18 Economic liberalization 
and market competition may trigger higher economic growth, so that wealthier countries 
tend to be not only the most open ones but also those with the most competitive national 
markets. In addition, richer countries might also have larger domestic markets, potentially 
lowering the exposure to economic globalization. To purify our measure of market 
competition from its implicit wealth component we employ the predicted residuals of a 
regression of the competition measure on the log of GDP per capita in 2000, assuming 
the most flexible functional form.
19 These residuals reflect then pure market competition 
                                                 
18  However, in a sample of economically most globalized countries the variation in income inequality 
suggests that there is no connection with our measure of market competition. Our regression analysis (see 
next footnote) supports this conjecture.  
19  This regression was performed with a sample of 80 countries. Pakistan had to be excluded as an 
influential outlier. Log of GDP was employed assuming a polynomial functional form. All estimated 
coefficients were significant at the 5 percent level with an adjusted R2 of 0.655. The Jarque-Bera test did 
not reject the null hypothesis of normally distributed residuals. A measure of income inequality turned out  
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which abstracts from national wealth (or domestic market size). By choosing this 
measure, we view the degree of competition as pertaining particularly to the ‘other side’ 
of the market, namely approximating the number of potential trading partners in the 
economic environment an individual can choose among, that is independent of the market 
competition’s impact on national income. 
On the other hand, as the experiments by Brandts et al. (2006) suggest, we have to 
distinguish market competition in individual’s i’s economic environment from her own 
bargaining position in the market. Although the economy as a whole might be subject to 
fierce competition, a single agent might still extract (additional) rents by exploiting her 
market power during a single economic transaction. We approximate individual i’s 
bargaining position by a measure of her (absolute) income position, provided by the 
World Values Survey. The WVS offers information on individuals’ income based on ten 
country-specific income brackets that can also be interpreted as a 10-scale ranking. 
Cross-country comparability of these ranks is ensured by them roughly representing the 
ten income deciles of each national income distribution. As common, we measure 
bargaining position relative to the weakest position as reference point. 
By employing income as measure of bargaining power, we also follow the tradition in 
political science that uses GDP as measure of a country’s capabilities and proxy for a 
country’s representative’s weight in international negotiations (e.g. Schneider, 2005). 
However, individual income might not only approximate bargaining position but equally 
other persons’ characteristics such as resources, skill, education, or simply, income. In 
principle, these correlations do not pose a problem as long as they are strong and highly 
positive. Indeed, by employing individual i’s income position to measure her bargaining 
position we implicitly assume that income is highly correlated with and thus linked to 
having financial resources to search for alternative trading partners, lobby for her 
interests, or afford the costly enforcement of her contracts. Moreover, higher income 
ranks may well be the result of previous advantageous trade/exchange outcomes and, as 
such, proxy dominant bargaining positions in past transactions, predicting bargaining 
                                                                                                                                                 
insignificant, also jointly, even when testing several functional forms and was therefore omitted from the 
final specification. See Table A1 for detailed results.   
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position in present transactions. Similarly, higher skill and better education may equally 
be advantageous in economic transactions as, e.g. they might imply more calculating and 
better informed decision-making. Clearly, as bargaining power is only approximated, we 
are not able to completely exclude alternative explanations for our empirical findings, 
which we address in the conclusion.
20  
For assessing hypothesis 3, completeness of contracts is approximated by measures of 
legal quality, as better working and more impartial legal systems set an institutional 
framework that fills gaps in business/trade/exchange contracts through regulating the 
parties’ rights and obligations in case of unforeseeable events. In this study, three 
alternative measures account for the quality of the legal system: first, we employ two 
sub-indices of the Fraser Institute’s economic freedom’s index that pertain (1) to the 
‘judicial independence’ and (2) to the ‘integrity of the legal system’, both measured in 
1995 (Gwartney and Lawson, 2006). According to the Fraser Institute’s Appendix to its 
Annual Report in 2001, the first index component is based on various issues of the 
‘Global Competitiveness Reports’, a survey of leading CEO’s conducted by the World 
Economic Forum, and reflects the independence of the judiciary from interference by the 
government and, most importantly to our question, by any of the parties in dispute. 
Instead, the second measure is related to legal corruption, namely the absence of 
“irregular payments to judges, court personnel, or other officials” (Gwartney and 
Lawson, 2001, p.26), reflecting facets of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
mostly based on Political Risk Component I (Law and Order) from the International 
Country Risk Guide (PRS Group).  
As third measure, (3) the rule of law component of the Kaufman governance quality 
indicator of 1998 complements the set of quality of legal system variables. According to 
Kaufman et al. (2003), the “rule of law” indicator is based on a regression with data from 
various distinct sources and reflects, among others, general public safety, average norm 
compliance, crime as a threat to business, enforceability of private and government 
                                                 
20  As education might equally proxy bargaining power, it has been excluded from the model. See also next 
section and footnote 22.   
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contracts, protection of property rights, fairness of judicial process and judicial 
independence, as well as quickness and enforceability of court decisions.  
Overall, the Fraser indices appear to measure specific and narrow aspects of the quality 
of a country’s legal system, while the Kaufman index mirrors a broader definition, giving 
rise to the well-known ‘kitchen sink’-nature-criticism. For their descriptive statistics, see 
Table 1.  
--------------------------------- 




In our model, we view life satisfaction of individual i in country s (SWBis) as a function 
of her bargaining position under specific market environments (POSis*COMPs,), 
measured by the variables introduced above. Thus, by interacting the individuals’ income 
ranks with the degree of national competition (due to globalization) we explicitly model 
how the well-being effects of market power change with the degree of market 
competition (coefficient γ ). In addition, through inclusion of POSis itself, that is not 
interacted, we allow also for well-being effects of bargaining position that are rather 
independent of market environment (coefficient β).
21 This relation can be expressed as 
follows: 
 
  SWBis =     β POSis + γ POSis*COMPs + δ’Xis + εis    (1) 
 
                                                 
21  Note that in the experiments by Brandts et al. (2006) the size of the monopoly player’s pay-off is 
independent of the degree of competition on the other side of the market.   
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Vector Xis contains the remaining control variables, including individual-level socio-
demographic determinants as well as country fixed effects, while εis denotes the 
individual-specific error term. The selection of most of these individual-level variables is 
based on previous life satisfaction studies (e.g. Bjørnskov et al., 2008, 2008a; Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005). In order to ease the interpretation of income rank as market power, we 
exclude those individual-specific determinants that are highly correlated with income and 
might equally reflect facets of a bargaining position in (market) transactions, e.g. 
education, occupational status, and political orientation.
22 In consequence, we employ 
mainly gender, age, family type, generalized trust, religious denomination, service 
participation, and belief in a superior being as controlling factors of well-being. The 
country fixed effects absorb any impact of country-specific characteristics such as 
institutions, culture, and macro-economic conditions as well as consumption possibilities 
at the country level (GDP). Thus, they also capture effects exerted by the degree of 
market competition per se.  
Given the categorical nature of the dependent variable, we apply an ordered probit 
estimation technique. For simplicity, only the results for the variables of interest (POSis 
and POSis*COMPs) are reported in the main text of the paper, while the estimation 
outcomes for the Xis variables for the whole population can be found in the Appendix 
(Table A2). Focusing on these interplays between individual-specific and macro-level 
determinants of well-being may also have the methodological advantage that 
identification of the effect of macro-level market competition is facilitated in a micro-
level cross-section with no variation over time. Following the empirical happiness 
literature, as reference group we chose the persons with the weakest bargaining 
position.
23 
                                                 
22  In general, persons with higher education or those who are active in the labor market are likely to have 
more bargaining power compared to those with little education or without employment. In addition, 
persons with more market power are more likely to oppose income redistribution and, thus, be found 
among those with a conservative ideology.  
23  For a life satisfaction model comprising individual-level factors combined with explicitly modeled 
macro-level determinants, see Bjørnskov, Dreher, and Fischer (2008). Since we are mainly interested in the 
interaction between competition and market power, a country fixed effects specification seemed more 
appropriate. Moreover, macro-level competition is multicollinear with country fixed effects, so that its pure 
impact remains unobservable in cross-sectional data.  
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4 Results 
The estimation results for the bargaining position, measured by the ten income ranks, and 
their interactions with market competition are presented in Table 2. For reasons of 
comparison, column (1) excludes the interaction terms and report only the per se effects 
of income. Columns (1) and (2) display the results for the whole population, while 
column (3) and (4) report the outcomes for the two subpopulations by gender. In all 
estimations, the reference group is formed by those persons in the lowest income rank.   
In model (1), which excludes the interaction terms, we observe for the whole population 
that persons with an income higher than those in the reference group tend to report higher 
levels of life satisfaction. Moving from one income rank to the next higher, we observe 
increases in coefficient sizes as well as in magnitudes of marginal effects (from 0.019 for 
rank 2 up to 0.157 for rank 10, for a complete list see the appending table to Table 2). 
Most of these differences are statistically significant.
24 These findings suggest that life 
satisfaction rises with absolute income (rank) relative to the reference group, being in line 
with the previous happiness literature (e.g. Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). The welfare effects 
of absolute income are supportive of the experimental outcomes by Brandts et al. (2006) 
that found happiness to be positively correlated with financial gains, the number of 
successful transactions, and trade frequency. The reader should note that if we had 
chosen the median income rank as reference point, we would have observed that life 
satisfaction declines (increases) with growing negative (positive) distance from the 
comparison group, being in line with the literature on positional concerns (e.g. Clark, 
Frijters and Shields, 2007, Fischer and Torgler, 2007).
25 
Model 2 (column 2) includes now the interaction terms between market competition and 
income rank. Comparing the estimates of the (non-interacted) absolute income ranks for 
                                                 
24  However, an exception pertains to the insignificant difference between the 7
th and the 8
th income ranks. 
In this paper, all cross-model and within-model comparisons of marginal effects are based on weighted 
OLS regressions. Given that the dependent variable has 10 categories, using OLS yields reliable results (see 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). 
25  Econometrically, the choice of the comparison income group does not affect the estimates of the 
remaining non-financial covariates.   
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model 1 with those obtained for model 2, we find a striking cross-model similarity of 
point estimates and marginal effects, an observation that is supported by appropriate 
statistical tests.
26 The fact that models 1 and 2 differ only with respect to the interaction 
terms lets us draw the following conclusion: Obviously, the total well-being effect of 
income consists of two rather distinct and independent components: on the one hand, a 
‘per se’ effect that is quite unaffected by and independent of market competition, and an 
additional effect that varies under different degrees of market competition. (Notably, the 
size of the total effect of income is then equally dependent on the intensity of market 
competition). This finding of two independent effects is analogous to the observation in 
Brandts et al. (2006) of monopoly player A experiencing increases in well-being as 
competition rose that were unrelated to her financial gains from trade, which stayed the 
same in the two treatments.  
Our focal variables are, however, the interaction terms that relate to competition-
dependent effects of bargaining power. In general, we observe in column (2) for all 
persons a significant and positive interaction between intensity of market competition and 
income rank, suggesting that in a more globalized economy the positive contribution of 
one’s bargaining power to individual well-being is enlarged, compared to the group with 
the weakest bargaining power. This finding is in support of hypothesis 1. Again, the 
choice of the comparison group affects the sign of the estimates, and these empirical 
results are identical to observing a well-being lowering effect for persons below and an 
increasing effect for persons above the median income rank.  
The sizes of the marginal effects of the interaction terms do not show a strong variation 
across income ranks, an impression that is statistically corroborated. In other words, for a 
given level of competition, it appears that the aggravating effect of competition is of 
equal  magnitude  for  all  income  ranks  (namely  γ2 = γ3 = γ4  etc.).
27  However,  these 
                                                 
26  Indeed, only the difference in the coefficients and marginal effects of the interaction terms between the 
5
th and the 8
th income ranks is significant (at the 5 percent level).  
27  It should be noted that our results do not suggest that the total effect of marginal income on well-being 
(δSWBis/δ POSis = β + γ COMPs) is identical across all income groups. Indeed, it is composed of two 
terms: an independent absolute income part (β) and a part that depends on competition (γ COMPs ), with the 
first varying across income ranks (namely β2 < β3 < β4  etc.).   
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marginal  effects  are  to  be  interpreted  with  respect  to  the  lowest  income  group  only 
  −  when switching from the reference group’s income to the income rank in question. In 
other  words,  these  estimation  results  are  not  suitable  for  gauging  marginal  effects  of 
income between two consecutive ranks (with rank > 1) that assume cardinality.  
Assuming cardinality and continuously differentiability of the 10-category WVS income 
measure, we estimate a similar life satisfaction model with the interacted and non-
interacted income rank dummies replaced by the original WVS income variable. In other 
words, the functional form of SWB with respect to cardinal income and market 
competition is assumed to be of the following form:
28  
 
SWBis = α INCis + β INCis * INCis  +  γ INCis * COMPs  
 
Estimating this model (including the usual covariates, Xis) as weighted ordered probit or 
OLS, the coefficients of both the interaction term and the income variable are all positive 
and significant (α, γ > 0), at least at the 5 percent level, while a negative one for the 
squared income (β < 0) indicates decreasing marginal utility of income.
29  
For illustration of the observed effects, Graph 1 plots the experienced utility for all 10 
income ranks and four different levels of competition (COMP = 0, 1, 5, and 10, 
respectively), setting all other covariates (including the constant) to zero. In addition, two 
utility difference curves depict the gap in well-being for three distinct degrees of 
competition, COMP = 5 versus COMP = 1, as well as 10 versus 1, respectively.  
 
                                                 
28  Preliminary estimation results with various model specifications suggest that the interaction between 
competition and income is of a linear nature (corroborated by appropriate Wald-tests), while income per se 
appears to exhibit decreasing marginal utility. 
29  The values are 0.287 for INC, -0.012 for INC
2, and 0.011 for the interaction term INC*COMP based on 
the weighted OLS regression.   
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comp = 10
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As can easily be seen from Graph 1, individual well-being rises with income, and thus 
with one’s strength in bargaining position. Please note that the point estimates clearly 
indicate decreasing marginal utility from income, despite the rather linear appearance of 
the utility curves in the graph.  
First of all, graph 1 illustrates that market competition contributes positively to well-
being as utility curves with a higher degree of competition lie above those with a smaller 
degree. Thus, for a given (positive) income level / bargaining power, intensifying 
competition leads to an increase in experienced utility. The same interpretation applies to 
the utility differences curves, which lie all in the positive dimension.  
Our main interest, however, is the question how the marginal impact of income for 
happiness is affected by changes in the degree of market competition. In graph 1, it is the 
slope of the utility curves that reflect the marginal utility of income. Clearly, as 
competition rises, the slopes of the utility curves become apparently steeper. Evidently, 
well-being rises faster in bargaining position as competition intensifies. In other words, 
market competition appears to tilt the well-being curve upwards. This tilt is also 
prominent when the slopes of the two curves calculated as the well-being difference for 
two different degrees of competition (10 and 5, respectively, versus 1). Depicted at the  
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bottom of graph 1, again, the slopes appear steeper as the difference in competition 
rises.
30 To sum up, Graph 1 illustrates how market competition re-enforces the bargaining 
power position effects for well-being.     
Summing up, in support of hypothesis 1 and as demonstrated in the economic 
experiments by Brandts et al. (2006), column 2 of Table 1 shows that competition affects 
the impact of one’s bargaining position on well-being, generating additional well-being 
gains, compared to the reference group. In our analysis, market competition appears as 
re-enforcing the bargaining effect on well-being, with the size of the additional gains 
increasing in income rank. Symmetrically interpreted, fiercer market competition triggers 
additional losses in well-being for individuals with less bargaining power than an average 
person – in contrast to persons with more bargaining power than the average.  
 
Results by gender 
Turning to the results by gender (columns 3 and 4 of Table 2), we first note that the 
similarity of the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients (and marginal effects) for the 
absolute income ranks across genders (see appending table to Table 2). This result 
suggests that utility gains due to increases in individuals’ absolute income are of 
comparable size for both women and men, possibly through improved consumption 
possibilities.  
However, when comparing the estimation results for the interaction terms across models, 
the competition effects previously observed for the whole population appear as almost 
entirely driven by the female subsample (except for the 3
rd and 4
th income ranks). More 
specifically, in contrast to the male population sample, in tendency, well-being of women 
depends positively on the intensity of market competition (for six out of nine income 
ranks), compared to the reference group. Consequently, one might conjecture that women 
                                                 
30  This procedure is equivalent to calculating the cross derivative of SWB w.r.t. to income and then to 
competition. As the first derivative of SWB w.r.t. income is δSWB/δINC = α + β * INC  +  γ  COMP, the 
estimates suggest that the marginal utility from income rises with competition (γ > 0).   
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gain relatively more in utility from competition than their male peers of equal income 
rank, strongly contradicting our hypothesis 2.  
On the contrary, we are not able to statistically reject the hypothesis that, for all income 
ranks, the effect of competition is of equal size across the two gender-specific 
subsamples, which substantially weakens the reliability of the previous interpretation of a 
gender-specific differential impact.
31 To analyze this question further, we split the sample 
by bargaining position (low, middle, and high income) and interact the gender dummy 
with our measure of competition. The interaction term always turns out insignificant, 
suggesting that no gender-specific impact of competition exists. Equally, inclusion of an 
interaction term of ‘being male’ with the degree of competition in the original model 
yields no significant results. Finally, assuming cardinal and continuously differentiable 
income equally suggests, on the one hand, an advantage of the female population over the 
male in the respective subsample, but, on the other, again, a comparable impact of 
competition across genders when testing the hypothesis of equally sized marginal 
effects.
32  
Taken all together, Table 2 suggests that there may not be any gender-specific differences 
in turning market competition into additional welfare benefits.
33 Obviously, when it 
comes to real life, gender-specific advantages in coping with such competition do not 
appear to substantially matter to individual well-being. This finding contradicts our 
hypothesis 3 and contrasts previous experimental economics evidence, which, however, 
deals with, on the one hand, competitive environments (tournaments) and, on the other, 
gender differences in performance, that is pay-offs. Alternatively, an explanation for our 
empirical finding may equally build on aspiration theory that views well-being as the gap 
between aspired and achieved utility. It might well be that, despite of an existing gender-
specific dis(advantage) for achieving under competition, internalization may also trigger 
gender-specific changes in aspiration levels, leaving the gap between both aspired and 
                                                 
31  Based on F-tests on equality of coefficient sizes across the two equations. See also footnote 24. 
32  Results are not reported but available on request.  
33  Significance levels of the coefficients on the interaction terms are higher in a subsample of countries 
with a low legal quality (see Table 3). However, even for this subsample no differential impact of 
competition by gender is observable.    
  26 
achieved utility unaffected. In consequence, the impact of competition on well-being may 
not differ across genders, ceteris paribus. These empirical findings also suggest that 
outcomes observed in the experimental lab (for individuals’ pay-offs) do not necessarily 
translate one to one into economic and social reality (of people’s well-being).  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Quality of the legal system 
Finally, we turn to the effects of well-working legal institutions and court systems for 
well-being (Table 3, columns (2) through (7)). For this purpose, the sample is divided 
into countries with either a higher or a lower rule of law index value than the median, for 
each of the Kaufman rule of law-index, the Fraser legal integrity and the Fraser judicial 
independence measures separately.
34 The results for the original, full sample of countries 
are reported in column (1) (equivalent to column (2) in Table 2). 
A comparison of the results across the two subsamples reveals that, in general, in 
countries with a high quality legal system the effect of the absolute income rank per se is 
more sizeable than in countries with a weak legal system, for two of three measures of 
legal quality and particularly for higher income ranks.
35 Overall, additional welfare gains 
of income appear to be induced by a well-functioning institutional framework. This 
                                                 
34  This procedure implies that countries in which the median value is present are excluded from the 
subsamples; however, inclusion of the median country in either subsample does not affect our results 
qualitatively. In general, as the three rule of law indices do not cover the full sample of countries, the 
number of observations of the two subsamples do not add up to that in the full sample.  









th income ranks when the 
Fraser measure of legal integrity was employed. Only one significant difference for the 9
th income rank was 
detected for the measure of judicial independence.   
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observation is in support of the argument that well-working legal institutions lower 
market transaction costs, facilitating economic exchange and thus improving 
consumption possibilities, ceteris paribus.   
In stark contrast are the regression outcomes for the interaction terms. In the country 
sample with a strong rule of law, almost all interaction term coefficients are insignificant, 
indicating that the welfare effects of one’s income rank are independent from the 
intensity of market competition.
36 In other words, a well-working, impartial and non-
corrupt judicial system prevents the exploitation of having a stronger bargaining position 
to reap additional benefits as competition on the other side of the market intensifies. This 
observation holds true for all three alternative measures of the rule of law employed 
(columns (2), (4), and (6) of Table 3). 
In contrast, in countries with a weak rule of law the significant coefficients on the 
interaction terms suggest that market competition interacts with individual market power, 
an observation mirroring the results for the full sample.
37 In general, the marginal effects 
in the low legal quality country sample, as statistical tests across equations reveal, are in 
most cases (often) significantly more sizeable than those observed in the high legal 
quality (full country) sample.
38 Assuming cardinality and continuously differentiable 
income shows, again, that the utility curve is tilted upwards as competition rises. In other 
words and in analogy of the previous findings (column 1), deficient legal institutions and 
inefficient court systems allow for additional welfare gains through a stronger bargaining 
position as competition in the economy gains momentum. Again, these estimation results 
                                                 
36  An exception, however, pertains to the 8
th income rank when the Kaufman rule of law index of 1998 is 
used. Such significance, however, is not observable in the samples based on the two alternative measures 
from the Fraser Institute.  
37  In most of the cases the marginal effects appear equally sized across the nine absolute income ranks, a 
finding equally mirroring the full sample outcomes.  
38  Significant differences in marginal effects between the two subsamples by legal quality were detected 
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are insensitive to the choice of any of the three alternative measures of rule of law, as a 
comparison of columns (3), (5) and (7) reveals.  
Overall, the results for sub-samples of countries split by the strength of the legal and 
judicial system in Table 3 suggest that the re-enforcing impact of competition on one’s 
bargaining power becomes only evident when law enforcement is weak and courts are 
corrupt. This finding is in line with our hypothesis 3 that states that under completeness 
of contracts market competition does not affect the impact of bargaining position on well-
being. However, alternatively, the differential impacts in these two country sub-samples 
may well be caused by more accurate and reliable data collection in countries with a high 
legal quality (= high GDP), while in the low legal quality country sample a measurement 
error manifests in the occurrence of significant interaction terms. In consequence, we 
cannot completely exclude the possibility that our findings for the rule of law constitute a 
statistical artifact.  
 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
Robustness of results 
The main findings presented in Tables 2 – 3 were robust to changes in model 
specification such as to the exclusion of generalized trust that might partly work as 
bargaining’s power’s transmission channel under different market environments (see 
Fischer 2008). Equally, inclusion of measures of political ideology, occupational status 
and education did not substantially alter our results, although in the latter case for the two 
lower income ranks the significance levels of the income estimates decreased, suggesting 
that particularly persons in these income groups are well approximated by education 
characteristics.   
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A major concern that applies to most cross-section analysis is that of reversed causality. 
It might well be that happier persons earn more (because they are more productive or 
positively discriminated), causing a positive correlation between income and life 
satisfaction that does not reflect a causal relation going from the first to the second. Our 
model, however, is based exactly on this assumption. Econometrically speaking, an 
endogeneity of income may bias the estimated coefficient vector, producing unreliable 
results. Using cross-section data such bias can me reduced by applying instrumental 
variable techniques to the endogenous variable.  
As technical and theory-based requirements for choosing appropriate instruments, the 
variables in question should have sufficient explanatory power for the instrumented 
variable (income), while, at the same time, they should not constitute omitted variables in 
the main regression (happiness regression) (so-called ‘exclusion restriction’). The WVS 
includes some questions that relate to interviewees’ attitudes which have been, most 
possibly, formed during respondents’ childhood. To justify their usage as instruments for 
income, we argue that these attitudes are determinants of current and past effort, and we 
expect more effort to lead to higher income. As proxy for effort, we first employ the 
question whether a child should be educated to be ‘determined’ and to exhibit 
‘perseverance’. Assuming that a parent’s attitude towards child education may well 
reflect her own preferences, this variable may measure the respondent’s own degree of 
‘ambition’ that, arguably, should cause effort levels to be higher and earnings to increase. 
The other two instrumental variables pertain to two specific job characteristics that the 
respondent deems ‘important’, namely ‘having a good job security’ and ‘having good 
working hours’. Assuming life-time utility maximizing individuals, we can, ceteris 
paribus, expect optimal effort (and thus wage) to decrease in the degree of risk aversion. 
Similarly, having a preference for highly regulated occupations with a fixed number of 
working hours might equally mirror, for example, a high personal discount factor that is 
adverse to long-term human capital investment decisions, lowering future earnings. 
However, in order for the instruments to be valid, they should not affect interviewee’s 
happiness. From an economic theory viewpoint, a neutral impact of effort on individual 
well-being has to be justified. According to aspiration theory, experienced utility is  
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defined as the distance between the actual (achieved) utility level and the aspired level. In 
such case, persons with certain attitudes not only exhibit higher effort levels and thus 
achieve higher income, but may equally develop higher income aspirations (as part of the 
adaption process), compared to persons with lower effort levels. In consequence, the gap 
between actual and aspired utility may well remain unaffected by cross-personal 
differences in exerted effort, and, ceteris paribus, not affect individual well-being as 
defined by aspiration theory. Thus, from a theoretical viewpoint, proxies for effort may 
well meet all requirements for being good and valid instruments for income in a 
happiness context.   
Turning the econometric analysis, we report the results for the first stage (auxiliary) 
regression in Table A3 of the Appendix. Assuming cardinality of income, indeed, our 
instrumental variables show to be significant determinants of income with the predicted 
signs: while the proxy for ‘ambition’ exerts an income increasing impact (at the 1 percent 
level of significance), both ‘job security’ and ‘good working hours’ decrease 
respondents’ earnings (both at the 1 percent level of significance). The F-test on the 
excluded instruments equally indicates that all three variables have (jointly) a strong 
predictive power, with an F-value beyond 35 for either auxiliary regression.
39  
As regards the validity of the instruments, the Hansen J-statistic (chi2(1) = 0.053, p-value 
= 0.81) suggests that the overidentifying restrictions are met, meaning that the proxies for 
effort have been correctly excluded from the happiness regression. This is also supported 
by the Anderson-Rubin Wald test  (chi2 (3) = 5.89, p-value: 0.11), which is more reliable 
in the presence of weak instruments.
40 Moreover, the Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
indicates that no underidentification problem is present (rejection of H0), meaning that 
the reduced form-equation is identified (chi2(2) = 24.18, p-val = 0.0000). A similar test 
(based on the related Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald statistic) shows that the bias in the IV 
estimate is less than 10% of the maximal IV size, meaning that the employed instruments 
                                                 
39  The instrumental variable regression was carried out using the user-written Stata command ivreg2 
(Baum et al, 2007), that contains a wide array of validity tests which we report in our discussion.  
40  In principle, even a sufficiently strong F-statistic on the excluded instruments does not rule out the 
possibility that instruments are weak.   
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are not weak and yield reliable estimates for the endogenous variable in the main 
happiness regression.
41  
Employing cardinal income and its squared term, the estimates for both income variables 
are jointly significant at the 5 percent level, with income increasing in subjective well-
being, but at a declining rate. Using the log of income instead, already assuming 
decreasing marginal utility, yields a positive coefficient significant at the 5 percent level. 
The important aspect of the IV estimation results is that, taking account of potential 
endogeneity, income still impacts individual well-being positively. Moreover, an 
endogeneity test based on the described IV models and estimations suggests that (log) 
income is, in fact, an exogenous determinant of well-being (Chi2 (2) = 0.382, p-val = 
0.8680; for log of income: Chi2 (1) = 0.009, p-val = 0.9248).
42 Thus, our estimation 
results for happiness presented and discussed in this paper are not likely to be a product 
of model misspecification, at least as far as income is concerned.
43   
 
 
5 Summary and conclusion 
This paper uses the World Values Survey data on more than 80,000 individuals of more 
than 60 countries to investigate the impact of market competition on subjective well-
being (happiness). Although our analysis potentially suffers from irresolvable 
measurement problems and endogeneity issues due to the cross-sectional nature of the 
data, we nevertheless find support for two out of three predictions based on experimental 
outcomes, while one is rejected. Thus, this paper is the first to provide an econometric 
analysis of the impact of market competition on subjective well-being, successfully 
contributing to the empirical literature in happiness research. In addition, it also adds to 
                                                 
41  The reported test statistics relate to the model in which cardinal income and its squared term are 
(simultaneously) instrumented in the main regression. The test statistics are similar and qualitatively 
identical for the specification using the log of income.  
42  Please note that the results of the test for endogeneity are only reliable when valid instruments are used. 
43  In principle, all of the more than 20 micro-level determinants employed in this study could be subject to 
reversed causality. Please note that it is almost a tradition in happiness research not to econometrically test 
the exogeneity assumption when working with cross section data.  
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the strand of literature that tests to what extent outcomes from the experimental 
laboratory may be suitable to explain real-world phenomena. However, this study also 
sheds light on research questions for which investigative economic experiments are still 
lacking.  
In this study we find that market competition re-enforces the effect of an individual’s 
bargaining position in transactions for her well-being (hypothesis 1): competition yields 
additional welfare gains from trade as it intensifies - compared to the weak position 
reference group. Assuming cardinality, we detect an upward tilt in the experienced utility 
curve suggesting that the beneficial effects of competition increase in income. Based on 
experimental outcomes of social dilemma games with altered numbers of competitors, as 
reported in Brandts et al. (2006), we conjecture these additional happiness gains to be 
caused by non-financial, emotional benefits of exerting market power, or, more 
explicitly, the ‘joy of rejecting’ potential trade partners. In principle, however, we are not 
able to rule out the interpretation that, in real life, a share of the observable additional 
well-being gains are linked to non-psychological factors such as earning opportunities or 
consumption possibilities effects. Moreover, it is also not completely possible to 
eliminate alternative interpretations of our bargaining power measure. In such case, 
however, even when assuming alternative interpretations of income rank as resources, 
skill, education or just income, the happiness gap enlarging effect of market competition, 
our focal finding, prevails.  
Rejecting our prediction we are not able to identify a differential impact of competition 
by gender that would have suggested that men fare significantly better as competition 
rises, compared to the female population. At first sight, this finding appears to contradict 
experimental economic outcomes demonstrating that in competitive situations male 
participants were able to achieve substantially higher pay-offs compared to the female 
test takers (Gneezy et al, 2003). However, internalization of gender-specific 
(dis)advantages may well lead to gender-specific aspirations that, accordingly, cause the 
gender-specific gap between actual and aspired utility levels (or consumption levels) to 
remain unaffected as the degree of market competition changes, ceteris paribus. Up to  
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date, however, experimental evidence on the gender-specificity of well-being impacts of 
competition is still missing, particularly within a market economy context.  
Finally, we find that well-working legal institutions and court systems do not allow for 
additional bargaining position-dependent welfare gains as market competition rises. 
Thus, well-protected property rights and enforceability of contracts appear to restrain 
exploitation possibilities that relate to the joy of rejection or, alternatively, to additional 
financial gains as competition on the other side gets fiercer, while a weak rule of law 
admits them. However, this positive welfare effect of the rule of law equally lacks 
corroboration by appropriate economic experiments allowing for complete and 
incomplete contracts under different degrees of market competition.  
As policy conclusions, one could naively argue that weakening the rule of law combined 
with strong market competition might be a desirable state of society as welfare seems to 
be increased, as our econometric analysis suggests. However, such conclusion would be 
too short-sighted. First of all, the directions of the effects of market competition are, in 
fact, sensitive to the choice of comparison group - our econometric design takes the 
weakest bargaining power as reference point. Choosing the median position as reference 
point, we would have observed an aggravation of well-being differences due to existing 
social cleavages in terms of income position. In addition, the economic experiments by 
Brandts et al. (2006) suggest that under incomplete contracts negative emotions are 
experienced by the rejected players as competition on their own side rises, possibly due 
to experienced ‘social stress’.
44 However, market competition might also exert positive 
effects that are of a rather long-run and indirect nature, which our empirical set-up does 
not capture. For these reasons, no final conclusion can be drawn with respect to the total 
impact of market competition on societal well-being in a Utilitarian tradition. 
Arguably, our findings bear also important policy implications for underdeveloped 
nations that are in search for the optimal growth path. Our results suggest that the 
establishment of an impartial justice system and the protection of property rights are 
                                                 
44  For evidence of the stress-inducing effect of competition for rats and grassland plants, see e.g. Bohus et 
al. (1993) and Scebba et al. (2006).   
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likely to prevent welfare losses through intensified market competition. Thus, developing 
well-working legal institutions should preclude any economic liberalization. Indeed, a 
famous example for a misplaced liberalization policy that lead to such welfare losses due 
to dysfunctional government institutions is, most possibly, Russia in the 1990ies. Our 
finding of the importance of the rule of law is also in line with the critique formulated by 
Stiglitz (2002, 2006), who claims that recent development policies were naively based on 
economic textbook predictions that free and competitive markets lead to positive 
economic outcomes by themselves, not taking into account that in newly developing 
countries incomplete information, inadequate markets, and dysfunctional institutions 
would distort such development.   
This policy conclusion of a priority of strengthening the ‘rule of law’ over the 
introduction of market competition is also in line with recent empirical cross-national 
happiness analyses on formal institutions and governance structure for more than 60 
countries (Helliwell and Huang, 2008, Bjørnskov et al., 2008b). These studies reveal that 
for poor countries a well-working judicial system is beneficial to overall welfare, while 
competition in the political sphere (as reflected in the strength of democracy) does not 
contribute to it.
45 To sum up, these and my own results suggest that the benefits of 
institutions built on the principle of competition may become eminent not 
unconditionally, but rather after some basic economic needs and institutional conditions 
such as the ‘rule of law’ have been satisfied.  





                                                 
45  In contrast, in middle- and high-income countries democratic institutions were conducive to happiness – 
in addition to the positive effects of a strict rule of law.   
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Table A1: Derivation of competition measure 
 
  1  2  3  4 
GDP 2000  30.494*  -3.655*  29.143+  28.696+ 
  [2.10]  [2.17]  [1.95]  [1.96] 
GDP 2000 ^2  -3.812*  0.263**  -3.649+  -3.604* 
  [2.15]  [2.72]  [1.99]  [2.00] 
GDP 2000 ^3  0.160*    0.154*  0.152* 
  [2.24]    [2.08]  [2.10] 
Gini coefficient      0.073  -0.275 
      [0.93]  [0.48] 
Gini coefficient ^2        0.042 
        [0.62] 
Constant  -78.353*  15.733*  -75.047+  -72.927+ 
  [2.01]  [2.16]  [1.87]  [1.86] 
Observations  79  79  76  76 
Adjusted R-squared  0.6549  0.6281  0.6548  0.6514 
Jarque-Bera test  .1783  1.284  .1773  .1115 
(p-value)  .9147  .5263  .9152  .9458 
F-test (Gini vars.)        0.67 
Notes: OLS estimation with Huber/White robust standard errors. ‘**’, ‘*’, ‘+’ denote significances at the 1, 
5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Dependent variable is the economic dimension of the KOF 
globalization index of 2000 (Dreher, 2006).  
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Table A2: Baseline model (Table 2 column 2): controlling variables 
 
Whole population  Whole population (cont.)   
Buddhist  -0.003  Has had 1 child  -0.022 
  [0.09]    [1.34] 
Muslim  -0.024  Has had 2 children  -0.011 
  [0.83]    [0.70] 
Catholic  -0.052**  Has had 3 or more children  0.003 
  [3.01]    [0.19] 
Protestant  -0.066  Believes in superior being  0.052** 
  [1.31]    [3.92] 
Orthodox  -0.128** 
Service participation: once a 
week  -0.075** 
  [4.04]    [4.32] 
Other Christian denomination  -0.062 
Service participation: one a 
month  -0.130** 
  [1.25]    [6.70] 
No denomination  -0.039* 
Service participation: on common 
holy days  -0.141** 
  [2.18]    [7.40] 
Jewish  -0.061 
Service participation: on specific 
holy days  -0.145** 
  [0.90]    [4.97] 
Hindu  0.037  Service participation: once a year  -0.185** 
  [0.84]    [8.44] 
Age  -0.033** 
Service participation: less than 
once a year  -0.210** 
  [18.61]    [9.85] 
Age squared  0.000** 
Service participation: never, 
practically never  -0.212** 
  [18.72]    [11.15] 
Male  -0.047**  Trusts most people  0.127** 
  [5.25]    [13.24] 
Single female  -0.008     
  [0.31]     
Single male  -0.086*     
  [2.08]     
Married  0.202**     
  [15.00]     
Cohabiting  0.097**     
  [3.40]     
Observations  79064     
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. ‘**’, ‘*’ denote significances at the 1, and 5 
percent levels, respectively. Dependent variable is subjective life satisfaction, measured on a 10-point scale.  
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Table A3: Auxiliary regressions: instrumental variables 
 
  1  2  3 





Teaching children ‘perseverance’ and 
‘determination’  0.356**  3.687**  0.088** 
  [10.01]  [9.29]  [9.83] 
Important: good job security  -0.197**  -2.646**  -0.030** 
  [7.08]  [8.63]  [4.15] 
Important: good working hours  -0.099**  -1.106**  -0.022* 
  [3.01]  [3.25]  [2.64] 
Constant  4.403**  23.931**  1.330** 
  [15.46]  [8.44]  [18.16] 
Individual controls  yes  yes  yes 
Country fixed effects  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  83794  83794  83794 
R-squared  0.22  0.21  0.21 
Notes: OLS regression. Standard errors adjusted for within-group correlation at the country level and 
heteroscedasticity. Individual-level and macro-level controlling variables (remaining instruments) are as in 
the baseline model. Relevant test statistics for the predictive power and validity of the instruments are 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for variables 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
           
Life satisfaction  79064  6.675  2.574  1  10 
Residuals economic globalization  79064  -0.113  0.619  -1.620  1.681 
Kaufman Rule of Law 1998  77893  0.400  1.024  -1.34  2.27 
Fraser Judicial Independence 1995  62066  6.300  2.087  2.33  9.82 
Fraser Integrity 1995  72310  7.025  3.118  0  10 
Income level 2  79064  0.140  0.347  0  1 
Income level 3  79064  0.143  0.350  0  1 
Income level 4  79064  0.151  0.358  0  1 
Income level 5  79064  0.125  0.331  0  1 
Income level 6  79064  0.104  0.305  0  1 
Income level 7  79064  0.085  0.279  0  1 
Income level 8  79064  0.066  0.248  0  1 
Income level 9  79064  0.047  0.211  0  1 
Income level 10  79064  0.045  0.207  0  1 
Buddhist  79064  0.013  0.113  0  1 
Muslim  79064  0.160  0.366  0  1 
Catholic  79064  0.350  0.477  0  1 
Protestant  79064  0.016  0.125  0  1 
Orthodox  79064  0.057  0.232  0  1 
Other Christian religion  79064  0.015  0.121  0  1 
No religious denomination  79064  0.179  0.383  0  1 
Jewish  79064  0.003  0.057  0  1 
Hindu  79064  0.023  0.150  0  1 
Age  79064  41.113  16.090  15  98 
Age squared  79064  1949.197  1494.701  225  9604 
Male  79064  0.487  0.500  0  1 
Single female  79064  0.050  0.218  0  1 
Single male  79064  0.013  0.113  0  1 
Married  79064  0.551  0.497  0  1 
Cohabiting  79064  0.045  0.207  0  1 
Has had one child  79064  0.145  0.352  0  1 
Has had two children  79064  0.250  0.433  0  1 
Has had 3 children or more  79064  0.292  0.455  0  1 
Belief in superior being  79064  0.772  0.420  0  1 
Service participation: once a week  79064  0.207  0.405  0  1 
Service participation: once a month  79064  0.115  0.319  0  1 
Service participation: on common holy days  79064  0.135  0.342  0  1 
Service participation: on specific holy days  79064  0.026  0.158  0  1 
Service participation: once a year   79064  0.067  0.250  0  1 
Service participation: less than once a year  79064  0.085  0.279  0  1 
Service participation: never/practically never  79064  0.234  0.423  0  1 
Trust in others  79064  0.258  0.438  0  1 
Notes: reference group are those with low income (rank1), other religion (no atheists), female, widowed, 
divorced or separated, no previous children, not believing in a superior being, service participation more 
than once a week, not trusting peer residents.  
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Table 2: Competition and subjective well-being 
 
  1  2  3  4 
  whole pop  whole pop  male  female 
Income level 2  0.097**  0.096**  0.095**  0.102** 
  [4.71]  [4.65]  [2.93]  [3.80] 
Income level 3  0.170**  0.168**  0.177**  0.162** 
  [8.36]  [8.16]  [5.63]  [5.94] 
Income level 4  0.291**  0.284**  0.292**  0.282** 
  [14.39]  [13.90]  [9.32]  [10.42] 
Income level 5  0.359**  0.352**  0.377**  0.331** 
  [16.85]  [16.25]  [11.87]  [11.23] 
Income level 6  0.441**  0.437**  0.445**  0.431** 
  [20.50]  [20.05]  [13.34]  [14.94] 
Income level 7  0.499**  0.497**  0.520**  0.477** 
  [22.99]  [22.58]  [15.52]  [16.25] 
Income level 8  0.513**  0.512**  0.530**  0.495** 
  [22.02]  [21.69]  [14.89]  [15.71] 
Income level 9  0.559**  0.557**  0.568**  0.549** 
  [22.69]  [22.07]  [15.42]  [15.67] 
Income level 10  0.618**  0.611**  0.625**  0.599** 
  [24.93]  [24.14]  [17.10]  [16.72] 
Competition * inc. level 2    0.080*  0.072  0.083* 
    [2.51]  [1.38]  [2.08] 
Competition * inc. level 3    0.096**  0.111*  0.082* 
    [3.11]  [2.24]  [2.06] 
Competition * inc. level 4    0.081**  0.099*  0.069 
    [2.60]  [1.97]  [1.73] 
Competition * inc. level 5    0.064*  0.076  0.056 
    [2.01]  [1.50]  [1.37] 
Competition * inc. level 6    0.083*  0.085  0.081* 
    [2.57]  [1.64]  [1.96] 
Competition * inc. level 7    0.103**  0.087  0.117** 
    [3.12]  [1.66]  [2.72] 
Competition * inc. level 8    0.121**  0.106  0.132** 
    [3.39]  [1.87]  [2.89] 
Competition * inc. level 9    0.082*  0.068  0.089* 
    [2.35]  [1.24]  [1.97] 
Competition * inc. level 10    0.072*  0.07  0.075 
    [2.01]  [1.26]  [1.56] 
Observations  81916  79064  38517  40547 
Pseudo R2  0.0596  0.079  0.0629  0.0595 
Number of countries  62  62  62  62 
Notes: Weighted ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. Individual-level baseline variables 
and country fixed effects are included but not reported. ‘**’, ‘*’ denote significances at the 1, and 5 percent 
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Marginal effects to Table 2 
  2  3  4  5 
  whole pop 
whole 
pop  male  female 
Income level 2  0.019  0.019  0.018  0.021 
Income level 3  0.034  0.035  0.035  0.035 
Income level 4  0.062  0.061  0.060  0.063 
Income level 5  0.079  0.078  0.081  0.076 
Income level 6  0.101  0.102  0.099  0.104 
Income level 7  0.118  0.119  0.120  0.118 
Income level 8  0.124  0.125  0.125  0.125 
Income level 9  0.139  0.140  0.137  0.143 
Income level 10  0.157  0.157  0.155  0.159 
Competition * inc. level 2    0.015  0.013  0.017 
Competition * inc. level 3    0.018  0.020  0.016 
Competition * inc. level 4    0.016  0.018  0.014 
Competition * inc. level 5    0.012  0.014  0.011 
Competition * inc. level 6    0.016  0.015  0.016 
Competition * inc. level 7    0.020  0.016  0.023 
Competition * inc. level 8    0.023  0.019  0.026 
Competition * inc. level 9    0.016  0.012  0.018 
Competition * inc. level 10    0.014  0.013  0.015 
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Table 3: Completeness of contracts - rule of law 
 
  Full sample 





Fraser Integrity  
of Legal System 1995 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
  full sample  strict  weak  strict  weak  strict  weak 
Income level 2  0.096**  0.083**  0.096**  0.066  0.079*  0.073*  0.096* 
  [4.65]  [2.67]  [3.42]  [1.84]  [2.48]  [1.97]  [2.25] 
Income level 3  0.168**  0.177**  0.155**  0.142**  0.205**  0.191**  0.139** 
  [8.16]  [5.75]  [5.53]  [3.94]  [6.34]  [5.30]  [3.24] 
Income level 4  0.284**  0.311**  0.248**  0.288**  0.290**  0.299**  0.232** 
  [13.90]  [10.13]  [8.98]  [8.08]  [9.35]  [8.34]  [5.51] 
Income level 5  0.352**  0.394**  0.299**  0.398**  0.332**  0.371**  0.331** 
  [16.25]  [11.93]  [10.39]  [10.16]  [10.04]  [10.24]  [6.48] 
Income level 6  0.437**  0.450**  0.416**  0.469**  0.404**  0.407**  0.476** 
  [20.05]  [14.08]  [13.64]  [12.74]  [12.07]  [11.19]  [9.90] 
Income level 7  0.497**  0.491**  0.494**  0.494**  0.476**  0.460**  0.565** 
  [22.58]  [15.17]  [16.19]  [13.04]  [13.80]  [12.47]  [11.46] 
Income level 8  0.512**  0.488**  0.525**  0.485**  0.476**  0.419**  0.519** 
  [21.69]  [14.18]  [16.09]  [11.91]  [13.29]  [10.87]  [9.71] 
Income level 9  0.557**  0.473**  0.671**  0.477**  0.515**  0.433**  0.639** 
  [22.07]  [13.32]  [17.89]  [11.29]  [12.82]  [10.77]  [10.37] 
Income level 10  0.611**  0.598**  0.643**  0.607**  0.518**  0.564**  0.535** 
  [24.14]  [17.03]  [15.58]  [14.81]  [12.15]  [14.31]  [7.44] 
Competition * inc. level 2  0.080*  0.033  0.152**  0.009  0.038  -0.027  0.193* 
  [2.51]  [0.83]  [2.81]  [0.19]  [0.43]  [0.56]  [2.28] 
Competition * inc. level 3  0.096**  0.029  0.191**  0.008  0.216*  -0.032  0.254** 
  [3.11]  [0.72]  [3.65]  [0.17]  [2.52]  [0.64]  [3.21] 
Competition * inc. level 4  0.081**  0.035  0.139*  0.03  0.247**  0.004  0.161 
  [2.60]  [0.89]  [2.54]  [0.64]  [2.97]  [0.09]  [1.89] 
Competition * inc. level 5  0.064*  0.004  0.158**  0.03  0.197*  -0.043  0.277** 
  [2.01]  [0.10]  [2.79]  [0.60]  [2.34]  [0.89]  [2.99] 
Competition * inc. level 6  0.083*  0.016  0.203**  0.018  0.219*  -0.019  0.237* 
  [2.57]  [0.39]  [3.40]  [0.38]  [2.57]  [0.38]  [2.22] 
Competition * inc. level 7  0.103**  0.065  0.212**  0.026  0.246**  0.013  0.167 
  [3.12]  [1.56]  [3.38]  [0.54]  [2.84]  [0.27]  [1.32] 
Competition * inc. level 8  0.121**  0.089*  0.220**  0.055  0.157  0.011  0.423** 
  [3.39]  [2.11]  [2.66]  [1.11]  [1.71]  [0.23]  [2.77] 
Competition * inc. level 9  0.082*  0.025  0.228**  -0.003  0.111  -0.066  0.667** 
  [2.35]  [0.58]  [2.81]  [0.06]  [1.11]  [1.34]  [4.91] 
Competition * inc. level 10  0.072*  0.033  0.101  -0.008  0.142  -0.05  0.323 
  [2.01]  [0.77]  [1.05]  [0.16]  [1.28]  [1.00]  [1.50] 
Observations  79064  39321  38572  30359  30043  30734  22724 
Pseudo R2  0.079  0.0507  0.0525  0.0656  0.0470  0.0456  0.0572 
Number of countries  62  34  27  26  17  28  12 
Notes: see Table 2. 
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Marginal effect to Table 3 
  Kaufman Rule of Law 1998  Fraser Jud. Indep. 1995  Fraser Integrity 1995 
  2  3  4  5  6  7 
  strict  weak  strict  weak  strict  weak 
Income level 2  0.018  0.019  0.013  0.018  0.016  0.020 
Income level 3  0.039  0.031  0.029  0.049  0.043  0.030 
Income level 4  0.072  0.052  0.064  0.072  0.070  0.051 
Income level 5  0.094  0.064  0.092  0.083  0.090  0.077 
Income level 6  0.111  0.094  0.113  0.104  0.101  0.118 
Income level 7  0.124  0.117  0.120  0.127  0.116  0.147 
Income level 8  0.124  0.127  0.119  0.128  0.105  0.134 
Income level 9  0.121  0.174  0.118  0.142  0.110  0.174 
Income level 10  0.160  0.166  0.158  0.143  0.151  0.141 
Competition * 
inc. level 2  0.007  0.028  0.002  0.008  -0.006  0.039 
Competition * 
inc. level 3  0.006  0.036  0.002  0.048  -0.007  0.051 
Competition * 
inc. level 4  0.007  0.026  0.006  0.055  0.001  0.033 
Competition * 
inc. level 5  0.001  0.030  0.006  0.043  -0.009  0.056 
Competition * 
inc. level 6  0.003  0.038  0.004  0.048  -0.004  0.048 
Competition * 
inc. level 7  0.013  0.040  0.005  0.054  0.003  0.034 
Competition * 
inc. level 8  0.018  0.041  0.011  0.035  0.002  0.086 
Competition * 
inc. level 9  0.005  0.043  -0.001  0.025  -0.014  0.135 
Competition * 
inc. level 10  0.007  0.019  -0.002  0.031  -0.010  0.065 
Observations  39321  38572  30359  30043  30734  22724 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 